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SUMMARY OF POSNER'S REPLY TO EQUITY 
In its Appellee Brief, Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Equity") 
argues that it ought to be dismissed because Posner admitted that his real 
estate agent instructed Equity to close, and Equity's title agent merely 
followed the real estate agent's authorized instructions. Equity also argues 
that its title agent Helen Smith breached no duties to Posner when she closed 
with the $260,000 Financial Guaranty. None of these arguments provide 
this Court with a satisfactory legal basis for upholding the trial court's 
dismissal on a motion for summary judgment. 
With respect to Equity's arguments on authority, Posner replies that 
none of Equity's arguments provide a sufficient legal basis for finding a 
delegation of authority. For example, Posner's admission that a conversation 
between his agents occurred is not an admission as to its truth. Posner has 
consistently maintained that he never told Christoffersen that he approved 
the Financial Guarantee, that he never instructed her to tell Helen Smith to 
close, and supplied evidence that casts doubt on whether either agent had a 
reasonable basis for believing Posner had seen and approved the Guarantee. 
Nor are Posner's testimony or affidavits—in which he describes what he 
thought his real estate agent did at his closing, or describes his expectations 
1 
of his agents—sufficient proof of authorization, as evidence of authorization 
must show or at least suggest that Posner gave written approval for 
Christoffersen to act and speak on his behalf at closing. 
With respect to Equity's argument that its agent breached no duty 
when she closed with an unsecured $260,000 Financial Guaranty rather than 
the secured $263,900 Surety Bond required by Posner's REPC, Posner 
answers that a precondition to his sale was that the buyer supply a secured 
$263,900 Surety Bond. When Helen Smith closed with a document that did 
not specifically match those terms, without Posner's express authorization, 
she directly breached the escrow instructions contained in Posner's REPC 
and therefore breached her fiduciary duty to Posner. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. MR. POSNER'S RECITATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF 
OTHER PARTIES IS NOT AN ADMISSION AS TO THE 
TRUTH OF THE TESTIMONY 
The fact that Posner recites in his pleading "Ms. Christoffersen 
informed Ms. Smith that Mr. Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee 
written for the amount of $260,000 and stated that Equity could proceed 
with the closing" is not an admission as to the truth of the matter. Posner 
recites the above conversation based on the deposition testimonies of 
Christoffersen and Smith, who both testified the conversation occurred. 
2 
Posner was not present when Christoffersen spoke with Smith—he was in 
Florida (R. 327), so his acknowledgement that a conversation occurred does 
not reflect personal knowledge. On the contrary, Posner expressly denies 
that he "had approved the Financial Guarantee and stated that Equity 
could proceed with closing." (Eq. App. Br. p. 5). Posner never saw the 
Financial Guarantee, never told Christoffersen that it was okay to close with 
the Financial Guaranty, and never instructed Christoffersen to tell Smith that 
he approved closing the sale with the Financial Guarantee. His Appellant 
Brief supplies circumstantial evidence that neither agent saw the Guarantee 
themselves, and thus knew that Posner had given informed approval 
(Affidavits of Posner R 481-486; Facts and Disputed Facts R. 460-465; 
Exhibits R 487-545). There is a dispute about what happened just prior to 
and at Posner's closing which raises a genuine dispute of material fact that 
should have gone to the jury, and therefore Equity's dismissal on its 
summary judgment motion is inappropriate. 
II. POSNER'S TESTIMONY IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
OF CHRISTOFFERSEN'S AUTHORITY 
Equity cites the following quote, "admitted under oath," as evidence 
that Posner gave Christoffersen authority to instruct Equity to close: 
Q: Can you just elaborate on what your—what her [Ms. Christoffersen's] 
role at closing was? Was there an agreement in place that she would be 
contacted? 
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A: The only reason Kandis was at the closing was to get her commission. 
And my contact with her as being I guess my agent was to make sure that it 
closed. And she was the one that was negotiating back and forth with the 
contract as far as making sure that we had a surety bond and how much it 
was and everything else. 
Equity claims that Posner is bound by this position, having never 
modified it, but Posner actually did clarify what he meant: 
Q: Michael, I want to clarify something. When you were 
speaking.. ..[with Mr. Bennion]...you said you gave instructions to both 
Kandis Christoffersen and Helen Smith. I gather you said essentially the 
same thing to them, "Make sure a surety bond is in place." Is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But you said you did not expect Kandis Christoffersen to review the 
bond in any way: 
A: Right. 
Posner's first steps in initiating his lawsuit firmly support his denial that 
he had made any delegation to Christoffersen. Had Posner actually expected 
Christoffersen to accept the Surety Bond on his behalf, and to instruct Equity 
to close (Equity App. Br. p. 6), he could have named her in his original 
Complaint and alleged a breach of those duties. In fact, at the time he filed 
his initial Complaint, Posner was not aware that Christoffersen played any 
role at his closing. It was only after Posner received Equity's Answer, in 
which it stated that Christoffersen had instructed Smith to close, that Posner 
became aware of Christoffersen's actions and amended his complaint. 
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Posner contends that the instruction 'make sure the transaction closes' 
offered by Equity as proof of Christoffersen's extended agency, is nothing 
more than a general exhortation and certainly a matter that Helen Smith as 
escrow and title agent was expected to do anyway. Since Posner gave the 
instruction 'make sure the buyer supplies a surety bond' to both agents, 
Helen Smith's failure to make sure the buyer provided a surety bond is not 
excused by claiming that Kandis Christoffersen gave her instructions that 
were inconsistent with Posner's instructions, as Smith had her own fiduciary 
duty to Posner. 
As Equity states, the truth is not a nose of wax to be twisted and turned, 
but in this case, the truth lies in the documented evidence that was created 
just prior to and during the time of Posner's closing, such as the listing 
agreement, the REPC, the amendments to the REPC, the fax and phone 
records of calls made between the parties, the closing documents, and the 
Financial Guarantee itself. This evidence shows that Christoffersen did 
play a role in Posner's closing, but it was not one that he had delegated. 
Under Utah law, a principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf 
who represent a seller must have a written agency agreement with the seller 
that defines the scope of the agency. Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-6-1(6.1.11.1.) 
reads: "A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent 
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a seller shall have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the 
scope of the agency." The written listing agreement [Posner App. Br. 
Addendum 3] between Posner and Coldwell defines the scope of 
Christoffersen's agency, and it contains nothing about acting on Posner's 
behalf at this closing. l Smith herself stated that she did not believe 
Christoffersen was acting on Posner's behalf. (R. 469-471), therefore, 
neither the facts nor Posner's testimony support Equity's argument that 
Smith closed Posner's sale in the belief that Christoffersen was acting within 
her authority as Posner's agent. 
III. POSNER'S REPC WAS MATERIALLY CHANGED 
Equity disputes Posner's assertion that his REPC was materially 
breached when Smith closed with a $260,000 Financial Guarantee rather 
than with the $263,000 Surety Bond the REPC expressly required. (Equity 
App.. Br. p. 13-14). Equity suggests 1) that there was no meaningful 
difference between a document entitled 'Financial Guarantee' rather than 
'Surety Bond', and 2) that the $3,900 discrepancy between what was 
submitted and what the REPC required is immaterial because no payments 
1
 See also U.C.A.§25-5-4(l)(e): The following agreements are void unless the agreement, 
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement.. .every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation... 
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on the Guarantee were ever made and that failure to pay was not 'caused' by 
the $3,900 discrepancy. 
Equity argues that there is no real distinction between a financial 
guarantee and a surety bond. However, it is clear from the REPC 
Addendum 9 (Posner App. Br. Addendum 1), that Posner agreed to the 
Seller carry back for $263,900 secured in second position and that a surety 
bond would be issued in the amount of the $263,900. (Emphasis added) 
Posner made it clear that the surety bond was to be secured. The Financial 
Guarantee provided by American Natural Resources Corporation was on its 
face an unsecured instrument (Posner App. Br. Addendum 2). 
The difference in price between the REPC and the Financial 
Guarantee should have put Equity on notice of a fundamental discrepancy 
between the two documents. By closing the transaction nevertheless, Equity 
effectively changed the terms of Posner's seller financing. The $3,900 
change was material because it increased Posner's seller financing to 
$263,900; in the event of a buyer default, the Financial Guarantee (even had 
it been what Posner requested) would have paid back $260,000, leaving 
Posner $3,900 short. Posner agreed to sell based on his expectation that his 
seller financing terms guaranteed him receipt in full of the negotiated 
purchase price. 
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Acceptance of a document that neither matched the form or substance 
of the financial security requested, nor the seller financing amount specified 
in the REPC, constituted a material breach. By closing in breach of the 
terms of Posner's REPC, Equity closed on a sale to an unqualified buyer. 
The sale to an unqualified buyer, absent the financial protection his REPC 
required, left Posner with no choice but to buy back his land when the buyer 
defaulted, and thereby directly caused Posner's losses. 
SUMMARY OF POSNER'S ANSWER TO COLDWELL 
Posner will answer Coldwell's arguments that 1) his conduct met the 
requisite legal standards for striking testimony, 2) he failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trail court's ruling adequately, and 3) that he 
cannot prevail at trial without a real estate expert witness. Posner does not 
believe Coldwell presented any authority for awarding attorney fees in its 
defense of Posner's single claim for tort. 
2
 A material breach occurs when the failure of performance "defeats the very object of the 
contract" or "[is] of such prime importance that the contract would not have been made if 
default in that particular had been contemplated" Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 
P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). See also Rogers v. Relyea, 601 P. 2d 37, 41 (Mont. 1979): 
"A substantial or material breach is one which touches the fundamental purposes of the 
contract and defeats the object of the parties in making the contract." 
3
 Under the applicable standard of review, Posner's claim that a breach occurred must be 
taken as true for the purposes of this appeal. See Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 
72, 75 (Utah 2003): in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the reviewing court 
must] view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
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Correct application of the ruling in Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, 
Inc., 199 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008) demonstrates that Posner's late submission 
of his expert report was not a willful failure to obey the Amended 
Scheduling Order (hereinafter 'the Order'). Posner demonstrates that in all 
but one of the other examples of misconduct Coldwell attributes to him, it 
either misstates the record or incompletely summarizes in a way that distorts 
Posner's conduct. Posner also contests Coldwell's claim that he failed to 
marshal the case against him adequately. Posner is required to cite the 
factual findings that support the trial court's orders and conclusions of law 
under Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(9). However, findings of fact 
must be supported by sufficient evidence, 918 P.2d 469, 472 Askew v. 
Hardman (Utah 1996), and Posner was not obliged to summarize Coldwell's 
numerous other allegations of misconduct, as he believes they do not qualify 
as facts.4 Finally, Posner disputes Coldwell's characterization of his closing 
as so complicated that expert testimony is required as to the standard of care. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
STRIKING THE EXPERT REPORT 
4
 See Campbell v. Campbell. 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), citing Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991): "...appellants need not engage in a futile 
marshalling exercise if they can demonstrate that findings.. .are legally insufficient." 
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Coldwell's motion (R. 1527-1529), memoranda (R.1530-1558; R. 
1618-1624) and oral argument (Tr. May 12, 2008) were confined to the 
tardiness of Posner's designation of his expert witness Greg Froerer and 
their claim of prejudice. Posner's memorandum in opposition (R. 1610-
1617) and oral argument (Tr. May 12, 2008) was also limited to the tardiness 
claim and prejudice claim. The trial court rendered its opinion as to the 
issues of tardiness and prejudice (Tr. May 13, 2008) and its findings 
incorporated Coldwell's Memoranda in the Order (R. 1695-1699). 
In its Appellee Brief, however, Coldwell (App. Br. p 5-6) argues that 
".. .more importantly, the trial struck Posner's expert witness report and 
testimony to sanction Posner's repeated and persistent dilatory conduct in 
this case." Coldwell continues by arguing that by allowing Posner's late 
designation would be to endorse and legitimize his "persistent refusal to 
comply with the Amended Scheduling Order." 
There was absolutely no finding by the trial court of any "repeated 
and persistent dilatory conduct" and no finding that the reason the expert 
witness was excluded was because of such conduct. (R. 1695-1699; R. 1530-
1561; R. 1618-1624). The trial court merely found that the designation of an 
expert witness was filed late and Coldwell would be prejudiced by allowing 
the expert report and testimony. The only order suggesting dilatory conduct 
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was the trial court's Notice of Order to Show Cause (R 1515), an order 
directed at both parties. 
To avoid a reversal by this Court and to justify the harsh sanction of 
the trial court, Coldwell must demonstrate "willfulness, bad faith or fault." 
Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 967 (Utah 2008).5 As 
there was no such finding made by the trial court, Coldwell notes (App. Br. 
p. 15) that a lower court's failure "to make a specific finding of willfulness, 
bad faith or fault 'is not grounds for reversal if a full understanding of the 
issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate court.'" 
(Emphasis added) In support of the argument, Coldwell cites Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah App. 1989) and Preston 
& Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P. 2d 260 (Utah App. 1997). 
Arnica and Preston provide us guidance as to the kind of conduct that 
merits harsh sanctions. In Arnica, the sanctioned conduct included not 
responding to discovery requests for 8 months, and not responding to a 
Court ordered motion to compel. The Court, in reviewing the record, found 
support for a finding of willfulness, bad faith or fault as demonstrated by 
misrepresentation, bribery, intimidation of witnesses, brandishing a revolver, 
5
 See also Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997) Societe 
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commercialese S.A. v. Rogers, 357 
U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). 
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etc. (Id.) Similarly, in Preston, the Court upheld sanctions after noting that 
the record established the following findings: 
During thirty-four months, Preston had served Koller with two 
separate sets of interrogatories, sent an informal letter, and deposed Koller, 
in each instance requesting the disclosure of potential expert witnesses. Each 
request went unanswered. After nearly three years, the trial court ordered 
that an expert be retained, imposed a deadline, and expressly stated that the 
malpractice claims would be dismissed if Koller did not comply. (Preston, at 
263). 
Compared to the conduct in Arnica or Preston, Posner's conduct of 
filing designation of expert witness Gage Froerer after the discovery 
deadline, does not reflect the egregious conduct, in the form of repeated 
failures to respond to discovery requests, motions, court orders, bad faith, 
and so forth, that Arnica and Preston illustrate as being sufficient to 
demonstrate willfulness, bad faith or fault. As pointed out in Kilpatrick at 
967, the Constitution limits the power of the courts to dismiss an action 
without affording a party an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his 
cause (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et 
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 
1255 (1958). The Supreme Court has held that Rule 376 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure "should not be construed to authorize dismissal... 
when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, 
6
 Supreme Court referred to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are for the most part the 
same as Utah's Rule 37 URCP. 
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and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner." Societe 
Internationale, (Id. at 212).7 The Tenth Circuit confirmed that the clients1 
knowledge was integral to imposing sanctions. M.E.N. Co. v. Control 
Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir.1987). The sanction of 
dismissing Posner's Complaint is a sanction against him personally and he is 
entitled to due process under the United States Constitution. Aside from 
pointing out that the trial court did not address any willfulness, bad faith or 
fault, there is nothing in the Record that establishes Posner's willfulness, bad 
faith or fault in filing the expert designation late and Coldwell, in its 
marshalling of facts, does not present any such evidence. 
As there are no facts to find willfulness, bad faith, fault or even 
persistent dilatory conduct, the exclusion of Gage Froerer must be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S SANCTION WAS UNJUST 
Coldwell argues (App. Br. p. 16-18) that the sanction was just. The 
trial court's power to sanction emanates from the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, namely Rules 16 and 37: 
Rule 16(d) states: 
"Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling 
order , the court, upon motion ...., may make such orders with regard 
7
 Supreme Court referred to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are 
for the most part the same as Utah's Rule 37 URCP. 
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thereto as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B),(C),(D)." (Emphasis added) 
Rule 37(b)(2) states: 
"Sanctions .... If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 
16(b)..., unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the 
court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the 
failure as are just, including the following: (b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or 
parts thereof, ....dismiss the action " (Emphasis added). 
Coldwell itself admits that the 12 day tardiness was not enough 
justification to sanction Posner. During the hearing on its motion to exclude 
Gage Froerer's report, and when addressing the trial court's inquiry, 
Coldwell stated, "Again, the reason that this is a material issue is not so 
much [the] 12 days. We don't hang people out to dry for 12 days." (Tr. 
05/12/ 08: pg 37, lines 21-23) "... it's not a technicality we're seeking to 
enforce with this 12-day lapse. It's the fact that all of discovery went by 
without mentioning anything ...." (Tr. 05/12/ 08: pg 40 line 25 & pg 41 lines 
1-3). The thrust of Coldwell's motion, memorandum in support and oral 
argument was that Posner should have designated his expert witness well 
before the deadline, not that he was 12 days late. Coldwell itself deemed 
that the Order to Mediate (R. 875-879) had amended the Amended 
Scheduling Order8, and not only filed its dispositive motion for summary 
8
 "At the conclusion of fact discovery, and because the scheduling order had been informally 
amended by the Court's order to attend mediation, Coldwell Banker filed a dispositive motion .. 
it's motion for summary judgment immediately following the mediation .. the unsuccessful 
14 
judgment [R. 883-1042] 28 days after the Amended Scheduling Order 
deadline date of November 13, 2006 [R. 872-874], but noticed Posner for his 
deposition after the October 13, 2006 discovery deadline and deposed him 
on 11/20/06 [R. 880-882; 1290]. Coldwell also failed to observe the 
deadline for objecting to designated experts: that deadline fell 30 days after 
Posner's designation deadline [R. 872-874]. It is unjust to allow Coldwell to 
rely on an informal amending of the Amended Scheduling Order in making 
a filing and taking a deposition after the deadlines imposed in the Amended 
Scheduling Order and at the same time where Posner relied on the mediation 
order to delay designating his expert witness, to deny him the very same 
leeway. Not affording Posner the same consideration raises serious due 
process concerns, particularly in light of the severe sanction of dismissing 
Posner's Complaint and denying him the opportunity to have his claims 
decided upon the merits. 
III. THE RECORD DOES NOT CONTAIN EVIDENCE OF 
MISCONDUCT TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
SANCTION 
In this case, the record does not bear out Coldwell's numerous 
assertions that Posner showed a persistent refusal to comply with the 
Amended Scheduling Order, or that he was repeatedly and persistently 
mediation." [05/12/08: Tr. p. 4, lines 3-7] (Emphasis added). Coldwell noted that because of the 
mediation "we sat on the summary judgment motion" as its explanation for not filing by the 
November 13 '06 deadline. [05/12/08: Tr. p.38, lines 16-22] [R.1620] 
15 
dilatory. On the contrary, in multiple instances throughout its brief, 
Coldwell misstates or incompletely recites the record, as follows: 
1. Coldwell claims that "Posner made no mention of any experts 
in his responses to Coldwell's interrogatories" and "never supplemented 
those responses/' (Coldwell App. Br, p. 5, 8,12,16), but Posner 
specifically stated in his interrogatory response that "no final 
determination regarding...witnesses" had been made, Posner gave this 
reply in his interrogatories, (R.728), and noted it at oral argument (Tr. 
5/12/2008: p. 25-26). There is a categorical difference between stating "there 
are no experts in this case" and stating "No final determinations regarding 
witnesses have been made." The latter response was intended to indicate 
that Posner had not yet made a final determination on potential witnesses, 
experts included. It was not intended to mislead Coldwell. Indeed, the 
record shows that Posner did not even retain Gage Froerer until early 
November, 2006 (R. 1685), yet Coldwell cites Posner's failure to mention of 
Mr. Froerer in his September interrogatory reply as an example of 
misconduct. (Cold. App. Br. p. 5, 15). 
2. The formal discovery period for the parties was 6 months, not 
the "two years of formal discovery" that Coldwell claims. (Cold. App. 
Br. p. 5, 8, 15). Posner motioned to amend his complaint to include 
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Coldwell as a third defendant in December 2004 (R. 119-120), and Coldwell 
filed its answer in May of 2005 (R. 608-617). Posner and Coldwell 
stipulated to suspend all proceedings between the two parties in June, 2005 
(R. 635-637), pending the outcome of Posner's appeal against Equity Title 
and Independence Title. The record establishes that formal proceedings did 
not resume between Posner and Coldwell until May of 2006, when a 
discovery schedule was entered into the record May 2, 2006 (R. 648-652). 
Coldwell implies that Posner dallied for two years before designating an 
expert, but the record clearly shows that the length of formal discovery 
between the parties was approximately 6 months—May-October of 2006. 
3. The Amended Scheduling Order did not require Posner to 
designate an expert prior to the end of discovery. Coldwell states: "it was 
not until after the expiration of.. .fact.. .discovery... and after Coldwell 
Banker had filed a cumulative motion for summary judgment that Posner 
finally, and belatedly, designated [his expert] (emphasis added). (Cold. App. 
Br. P. 5). Coldwell never acknowledges that the Amended Scheduling Order 
deadline for designating an expert fell two months after the end of discovery 
(R. 723-726). It was reasonable for Posner to observe the Order's separate 
date for designating experts, and understand it as valid deadline for 
supplementing his discovery response. 
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4. The record contains no evidence that Posner's "omission and 
concealment of [anl expert witness prejudiced Coldwell and frustrated 
the effective management and litigation of the case..." (Cold, App. Br, 
p. 16), or that the preparation and costs of Coldwell's first summary 
judgment motion were compromised. Coldwell's first summary judgment 
motion rests upon the arguments that Equity closed Posner's sale according 
to his instructions, that the requirement of a surety bond was satisfied and 
the contention that Posner had, in any case, suffered no damages since, as a 
result of the sales, as he would reap "enormous profits"(R. 889).9 Neither of 
Coldwell's original summary judgment memoranda reference expert witness 
issues as Coldwell's defense focused upon the theory that Posner had 
suffered no damages [883-885 & 1264-1278]. 
5. The record does not show misconduct that followed a repeating 
pattern, Coldwell alleges that "the trial [court] struck Posner's expert 
report and testimony to sanction Posner's repeated and persistent dilatory 
conduct in this case.. ..allowing Posner's late designation would have 
endorsed and legitimized Posner's persistent refusal to comply with the 
Amended Scheduling Order and other basic tenets of formal discovery, 
which Posner so often ignored..." and so on. (Emphasis added) (Cold. App. 
9
 Posner has consistently denied that he made a windfall profit, and argues that in any 
case, this is not the correct calculation for damages. 
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Br. p. 5-6). In addition to characterizing Posner as a deliberate rule-breaker, 
Coldwell alleges sabotage, ambush, deliberate omission and concealment, 
and suggested deliberate written and oral misrepresentations.10 (R.1621). Yet 
the only factual finding the trial court made was that Posner's expert 
designation occurred two weeks late. 
Aside from the late expert designation, the record reveals one other 
delay: Posner acknowledges that he did not file a certificate of readiness for 
trial immediately after Coldwell's first summary judgment motion was 
denied in April 2007 [I486]. This is because he was not ready to take the 
case to trial financially and there was uncertainty about whether his senior 
lawyer, Michael Goldsmith, could continue as counsel. Mr. Goldsmith was 
originally retained as an experienced litigator,11 but ultimately withdrew for 
health reasons12 and David Ross was hired to replace him in October, 2007 
whereby he required time to review the case files. The record shows Mr. 
Ross' substitution of counsel notice (R. 1520-1521). 
Coldwell's brief suggests that Posner's contention that counsel mailed the expert 
designation on December 14 was "dubious", "suspect" and "mysterious."(Coldwell App. 
Br. p. 11) 
11
 This was the first case that the other counsel, Ms. James, had ever taken, and it was 
agreed that Posner needed a litigator with some experience. 
12
 Mr. Goldsmith was diagnosed with a slowly progressing form of Lou Gherig's disease 
(ALS) in fall of 2006. Initially uncertain that this was a correct diagnosis, Goldsmith did 
not wish to make his illness known; subsequently Goldsmith went public with his 
diagnosis as part of an effort to raise research funding, 
see:www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/sports/baseball/05vecsey.html 
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While Posner acknowledges he did not contact Coldwell during this 
time, neither did Coldwell contact him; Posner took Coldwell's silence as an 
assent to the pace at which the case was proceeding. 
7. The record contains no evidence of Posner's statements in 
mediation. Coldwell states "At no time.. .during the mediation did Posner 
reference, allege or represent that he had retained an expert in support of his 
claims..." (Cold. App., Br. p. 8); (Tr. 5/12/2008: p. 43-44). As the record 
does not contain any information about the mediation, which was 
i o 
confidential, these allegations are impossible to verify. 
9. Coldwell alleges that Posner was dilatory and delinquent in 
producing discovery documents, but the record does not support this 
conclusion, Coldwell's original summary judgment motion made no 
complaints about Posner's production of discovery documents and Coldwell 
presented evidence in support of its claim that Posner had reaped a windfall 
profit. It was only in March of 2008 that Coldwell filed a Motion to Exclude 
Documents and Testimony produced after the Expiration of Fact Discovery. 
In that memorandum, although Coldwell alleged that Posner failed to 
produce documents requested by Coldwell at his deposition on November 
13
 Circumstantial evidence in the record shows that Posner's expert was retained in early 
November and supplied an opinion prior to the mediation (R. 1685). Posner supplied the 
mediator with a copy of the expert report, and during mediation, Posner's counsel 
allowed the mediator to mention the expert report to Coldwell (Tr 5/12/2008: p. 27). 
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20, 2006, it never identified what he failed to produce. Similarly, Coldwell 
complained that "even now, Plaintiff produces documents that should have 
been produced years ago..." (R. 1567). In fact, the documents to which 
Coldwell was referring were created in April through December of 2007 (R. 
1606-1607), after the end of discovery. Coldwell alleged that Posner 
"consistently and pervasively withheld documents and evidence that 
mitigates his purported damages", yet only in a couple of its interrogatories 
(Nos. 11-12) or requests for production does Coldwell arguably request that 
Posner supply evidence of "mitigation of damages" and Posner responded to 
each such interrogatory and request for production of documents, including 
indicating that Coldwell could review the legal files of a lawsuit against 
Strachan at Posner's attorney's office (R. 727-743).14 Given the fact that 
construction on Posner's condominiums continued beyond the end of 
discovery, with attendant delays, unanticipated costs and conflicts, Coldwell 
might have expected an on-going stream of new information after the formal 
end of fact discovery, especially in view of the fact Coldwell Interrogatory 
#13 specifically requests an itemization of "costs incurred for any 
improvements made to the property" (R. 736). 
14
 Confounding this issue is the fact that Posner has a different theory of 
damages than Coldwell, and Coldwell only requested Posner to supply 
evidence to support his damages claim. (R. 1085-1087). 
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In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, the record simply does 
not bear out Coldwell's multiple allegations of misconduct and therefore, the 
record supports Posner's position that the sanction imposed was unjust. 
IV. POSNER ADEQUATELY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE 
As the Advisory Committee Order on Rule 24 notes: ".. .the 
challenger must present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists." (emphasis added), (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida 
Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P. 2d 1051, 1052-1053 (Utah App. 
1994). The appellant is not obliged, however, to marshal evidence that is 
not competent, and therefore Posner cited the only factual findings the trial 
court made in striking the expert report (5/13/2008: Tr. p.4-5)—the expert 
designation was two weeks late, and the trial had already been scheduled. 
Posner did not cite the numerous other allegations Coldwell makes because 
these allegations have such a tenuous basis in the record that they cannot 
properly be construed as facts. See Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 
638 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 
(Utah App.1991): "...appellants need not engage in a futile marshalling 
exercise if they can demonstrate that findings.. .are legally insufficient." 
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V. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED 
The fiduciary obligations that a real estate agent owes to her principal 
include the duties of disclosure, reasonable care and diligence.15 Disclosure 
is not complicated, as it can be easily distinguished from failure to disclose: 
did Christoffersen tell Posner the buyer supplied a Financial Guarantee or 
not? The obligation for written approval of contractual changes is also 
easily understood and proven: either there is a signature, or there isn't. 
Posner submits that in this case, Christoffersen herself 'set a standard 
that she then failed to follow: she obtained Posner's signature approving the 
change in seller financing amount, $3,900, but, having obtained Posner's 
permission to increase his seller financing, she then did not obtain any 
written approval of the $260,000 Financial Guarantee, a document that fell 
$3,900 of the very seller financing amount Posner had just approved. 
Christoffersen's breach of fiduciary duty in this case had to do with simple 
omissions: she failed to disclose that the buyer had supplied a document 
entitled Financial Guaranty rather than Surety Bond, she failed to obtain a 
signature approving that document, even though it departed from the REPC 
15U.A.C.A. R162-6-2. Standards of Practice. 6.2.15.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's 
agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who act solely on behalf of 
the seller or the lessor owe the seller or the lessor the following fiduciary duties:(a)-(b) 
omitted:...(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all 
material information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the 
transaction;.. .and (e) Reasonable care and diligence. 
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terms in both title and amount, without obtaining Posner's written 
permission, she told Equity to close. In Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 
821, 826 n. 8 (Utah. App.1989), the Court suggested that expert testimony is 
necessary when the background field of knowledge involves sophisticated, 
specialized knowledge: Expert testimony is required ?f[w]here the average 
person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or 
professions," as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and 
engineers." (Id.) Posner submits that the subject matter of real estate is not 
inherently complex, dependent on sophisticated mathematical or scientific 
concepts, or beyond the ordinary experience of laypeople in the same sense 
that engineering or architecture is. Many jury members, for example, have 
undoubtedly bought or sold houses, and this familiarity with the basic 
concepts of real estate surely qualifies a reasonable juror to comprehend 
Christoffersen's conduct, and assess whether her omissions violated her 
basic fiduciary obligations as Posner's real estate agent. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the preceding arguments, neither Equity nor Coldwell 
Banker has provided this Court with a sufficient legal and/or evidentiary 
basis for upholding the trial Court's respective summary judgment 
dismissals of each party. Therefore, Posner respectfully requests that this 
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Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of Equity because existing factual 
disputes should have precluded the grant of summary judgment, reverse the 
trial court's findings that Posner's real estate agent acted within her authority 
and that Equity breached no duty to Posner, and remand this case for trial. 
Posner also requests that for the reasons set forth, this Court find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Posner by striking his 
expert report, which led to the dismissal of his case, and reverse the trial 
court's ruling that expert testimony on the standard of care was necessary, 
remanding this case for trial. For the reasons stated in his original Brief, 
Posner also requests that this Court reverse the trial court's award of 
attorney fees under the Listing Agreement. 
Dated this 29th day of July, 2009. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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